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I. Introduction
In this paper we discuss variations or additions to the standard wealth maximizing search model. The first is the distinction between the search and out-of-the labor force (OLF) states. An individual has the choice between (1) being employed at a given wage rate, (2) being out-of-the labor force (OLF) and receiving a wage offer next period. The usual search model consists of only states 1 and 2, i.e., an individual chooses between employment and search, with no opportunity for non-market activities.
The second addition is to make wage and on-wage offer distributions depend on both the state of the economy and current wage and non-wage offers. Lippman and McCall (1976a) have already formulated a model where wage offers depend on the state of the economy; our formulation is more general, but we do not claim any new results in this area. Correlated wage offers, however, do appear to be new, and provide interesting results. In particular, the reservation wage property no longer holds. Even given a particular state of the economy and a particular non-wage offer, there need not be a wage such that higher offers are accepted and lesser offers rejected. (Note that with correlated wages a moderate offer may be accepted -it gives no signal about next period's offer. A slightly higher wage, however, could be rejected because it signals a high probability of an even better offer next period.)
The third variation is to formulate these search models in continuous time and to allow wage offer arrivals in all states. We make the assumption that all events are independently Poisson distributed, so that the waiting time to an arrival is exponentially distributed. In other words wage offers arrive at random times, with the time being Poisson distributed. This formulation has intuitive appeal, since any discrete time formulation introduces arbitrary time units and it has the advantage of simplifying some of the econometric problems.
II. The Model
We will build the model in three stages. First we introduce the out of the labor force (OLF) state into the usual stationary search model. The distribution of new wage and non-wage offers will be constant over time, and there will be no change in the economy over time. This model exhibits most of the usual search model attributes; e.g., given a particular non-wage offer there is a unique reservation wage, and the value of search is increasing in the wage and non-wage offers. We give proofs of the existence and uniqueness of the value function, the reservation wage, and the other properties of this model.
In the second state we introduce non-stationarity. We take a relatively broad approach, allowing next period's wage and non-wage offers to depend on this period's offers, and on this and next period's state of the economy. Many of the properties of the stationary search model do not carry through. We discuss properties of this model, but put the proofs of our properties in an appendix. The outline of the proofs are the same as for the stationary case, but technicalities make the non-stationarity case more difficult.
The third stage is to transform everything to continuous time, where offers arrive at random, independent, Poisson-distributed times. In addition we relax the constraint that wage offers only arrive in the search state. This is not a trivial change; in particular it opens the possibility of testing the existence of a search state separate from the employment and OLF states. The continuous time formulation is more tractable econometrically as well as being more realistic.
A. The Three State, Stationary Model
Individuals live forever and can be in one of three states: 1) Employed, receiving a known wage w per period until (voluntary) separation.
2) Out of the labor force (OLF), pursuing non-market activities with monetary remuneration of known n this period, and random N in the future. 3) Unemployed, paying a search cost of c this period to receive a random wage offer W new period. Time is split into discrete units (of a month, say), and only one state, wage offer, or nonwage offer is allowed each period. All wage offers are known at the beginning of the period, any decision is made at the beginning of the period, any decision is made at the beginning, and money is earned or paid at the beginning of the period. A new non-wage offer N is received each period, but a new wage offer is received only after paying the search cost c . When employed, a worker receives a fixed, known wage w per period until he quits. A worker is allowed to switch from state 1 to 2 or 3, from 3 to 1 or 2, and from 2 to 3. (It will turn out that in the stationary case a worker will never quit to start searching, i.e., will never go from 1 to 3 directly, but he may go OLF for one period and then start searching, i.e., may go 1 to 2, and then 2 to 3.) The distribution of next period's wage offer, W , is F(x) , and the distribution of next period's non-wage offer, N , is G(x) ; both F(x) and G(x) are known and unchanging.
We set up the problem by hypothesizing that there exists a continuous, bounded function of the current wage and non-wage offers, V(w,n) , that is the current value of the maximized expected lifetime earnings. This seems like an impossible problem, but using Bellman's principle we can make it simple. Denote the value of this period's maximized earnings as V(w,n) ; then βV(w,n) is the value (discounted at β=1/(1+r) ) of receiving the same wage, w , next period and the new non-wage offer N . In other words βV(w,N) is the value next period when employed this period. Similarly βV(W,N) is next period's value when searching next period. Next period's value when OLF this period is βV(0,N) , because having no job is the same as a job with zero wage. Note that βV(w,N) , βV(0,N) , βV(W,N) are all random variables; they depend on the random variables N , W . To get the expected value of each state we must add this period's return, and take the expectation over N and W , next period's random draws for nonwage and wage offers. Formally, the values of the three states are: 1) Being employed:
2) Being OLF:
In other words, the value of being in a particular state is this period's return plus the value of proceeding optimally tomorrow. The optimal value today will be the value of being in the best state. Mathematically, this says that V(w,n) must satisfy the following equation:
It is shown in the appendix that (1) has a unique solution within the class of continuous functions. Having constructed our model, which is summarized by equation (1) above, we can proceed to discuss some of its properties. The three-state model is much the same as the standard search model. In particular the value function, V(w,n) , is non-decreasing and convex in both its arguments. For a given value of n , i.e., a particular non-wage draw, there is a unique reservation wage offer, w * (n) . Similarly for a given value of w , there is a unique reservation non-wage offer, n * (w) . In addition both w * (n) and n * (w) are increasing in their arguments. All of this is a natural extension of the properties of standard two state models. For completeness, we will show how to prove these assertions.
First, we must reinterpret the right side of equation (1) as an operation T on the function v :
The function v(w,n) need not satisfy the equality in (1). In the appendix, however, we show that starting from any v 0 and applying T successively will lead to the V(w,n) which solves (1). In other words,
To see this, note that (3) tells us that starting from any allowable v 0 (w,n) leads to V(w,n) . If we start with a non-decreasing v 0 (w,n) and if the operation T preservers non-decreasingness, then the limit will also be non-decreasing. If v n-1 (w,n) is nondecreasing in (w,n) , then
is obviously non-decreasing in (w,n) , from the definition of T in equation (2). Since v 0 (w,n)≡0 is a good starting function, and is obviously non-decreasing in (w,n) , V(w,n) is non-decreasing in (w,n) .
A function f(x) is convex when
The paragraph above implies that we need only show that a convex v n (w,n) gives a convex v n+1 (w,n) and that an allowable v 0 (w,n) is convex. I.e. we must show
and note that (4) also says (setting w 1 =w 2 =w , then n 1 =n 2 =n )
The first inequality holds because v n (w,n) is convex in w . The second holds because the maximum of convex functions is itself convex.
c)
For given values of n or w , there are unique reservation wage and non-wage offers, w * (n) and n * (w) , respectively. This is obvious from looking at equation (1) above. The reservation wage is defined to be that wage below which all offers are rejected, and above which all offers are accepted. Setting the value of a job equal to the value of searching, we get an equation defining the reservation wage for n=0 , w * (0) :
No job will be accepted for W<w * (0) since searching has more value. Similarly we can get the reservation non-wage offer for w=0 , n * (0) : (7) n+βEV(0,N)=-c+βEV(W,N) .
Since EV(0,N) and EV(W,N) are constants, and EV(w,N) is increasing in w but is not a function of n , (6) and (7) define unique values. (There is one small caveat: the value of searching might be so low or the cost so high that any job is better than searching. In other words equations (6) and (7) may not have any solutions. If they do, however, they are unique.) For both w and n above w * (0) and n * (0) , the choice is between taking a job and being out of the labor force (OLF). The reservation wage and non-wage offers will depend on the given value of n or w . w * (n) and n * (w) are both given by setting the value of a job equal to the value of OLF: (8) w+βEV(w,N)=n+βEV(0,N) , w>w
Once again, if this has a solution, it is unique for w * (n) given n , or for n * (w) given w .
B. Three State, Non-Stationary Model
The model is essentially the same as in the stationary case, except that the random variables W and N are now functions of the current wage and non-wage offers. In addition, a new z variable is introduced to represent the state of the economy. This variable changes from period to period, and it also affects the random variables W and N . A higher value of z this period means the random wage and non-wage offers W and N are better, in that there is a higher probability of receiving a higher offer. A high z represents an active economy which has many high paying jobs, and also many lucrative opportunities out of the labor force. At this level of generality we don't specify exactly how z affects W and N , only that a higher z corresponds to more, better, offers. We also introduce the random variable Z , which is next period's state of the economy. Z is itself a function of z , this period's state of the economy, but it does not depend on the wage or non-wage offers. (We are taking a partial equilibrium approach to this model. All random variable, Z , W , and N , are exogenous to the decision process. In a full equilibrium model we would take into account the demand for labor and non-labor services, as well as individuals' supply decisions.)
To state things formally, Z, W, N are independent random functions over the real line ℜ and a probability space (Ω,ℑ,P) . In other words for real ω∈Ω
The arguments z , w , n are restricted to lie in some finite interval [0,M] , and Z(⋅) , W(⋅) , N(⋅) map into the same interval [0,M] . This keeps the wage offers from ever becoming infinite or negative. To keep the interpretation of z as a measure of the strength of the economy we require that W(w,z,ω) and N(n,z,ω) are non-decreasing in z for each ω , w and n . This insures that the probability of receiving a wage (or nonwage) offer at least as high as some x is non-decreasing:
is non-decreasing in z , for a given w . ( F w,z (x) is the distribution function for W given particular values of w and z .) Since wage offers are non-negative this means the mean of W(⋅) , for a given w , will increase with z :
What happens to higher moments about the mean depends on the particular function W(w,z,ω) .
To maintain non-decreasingness of the value in the wage and non-wage offers we must have that W(w,z,ω) and N(n,z,ω) are non-decreasing in w and n , respectively. This has intuitive appeal if wages reflect productivity, and current wage offers serve as signals of productivity. This stretches our simple model somewhat, but does give some vague justification for assuming non-decreasingness of W(w,z,ω) and N(n,z,ω) . Note, however, that the existence of an optimal policy and of the value function doesn't require this assumption. We make it because it insures increasingness of the value function in w and n .
The value function for this model will be a function of w , n , z : V = V(w,n,z) . The values of the three states are: 1) Being employed:
The value of receiving a wage and non-wage offer of (w,n) when the state of the economy is z is the maximum of the three values:
where
, H z (y) are the distribution functions of W(w,z,ω) , N(n,z,ω) , and Z(z,ω) for given (w,n,z) .
In the same way that we could prove the existence and uniqueness of a solution to equation (1) for the stationary case, we can prove the existence and uniqueness of a solution to (9) within the class of continuous functions. The proof of this, together with proof of convexity and increasingness of the solution to (9), is found in the appendix.
Taking the existence and uniqueness of V(w,n,z) as given we can easily see that the reservation wage property of simple search models does not hold. Look, for example, at the condition for indifference between taking a job and continuing search (for a given n ):
Both sides are increasing functions of w , even after we take the expectation. Thus we don't have any guarantee that (10) has a unique solution. It could happen that there are three solutions, so that all wages below w 1 are rejected, those between w 1 and w 2 accepted, those between w 2 and w 3 rejected, and those above w 3 accepted. This is a direct result of correlated wage offers. This situation might result if low wages (below w 2 ) all had significantly higher probability of getting even better offers. Then any offer below w 2 would lead to normal search model behavior, with some reservation wage w 1 . Any offer above w 2 might lead a worker to stay out of the market in expectation of a yet better offer. Thus we get a set of wages, between w 2 and w 3 , which are rejected.
The same kind of argument holds for non-wage offers. There is no reservation non-wage offer as long as we allow correlated non-wage offers.
We can also look at the employment, OLF, search choice as a function of z , for given w and n . There is no one value of z at which a worker is indifferent between work and search, search and OLF, and work and OLF. In the same way that correlation in wage offers may make it worthwhile to sit out in the expectation of higher offers next period, certain states of the economy may signal a high probability of even better times next period. This may lead to acceptance of low wage offers for low z , rejection of low offers for intermediate z , and then acceptance of the same low offers for yet higher z . In the intermediate range workers may sit out in the expectation of a better state of the economy and thus better offer distributions next period.
By dropping the correlation in wage and non-wage offers we get something that looks like the Lippman and McCall (1976a) model. The functional equation for an infinite lived individual is
The equation corresponding to (1), which defines the points of indifference between working and searching, is now 
These are all uniquely determined, but w * (n,z) and n * (w,z) are not increasing in z . Because of correlation in states of the economy and dependence on the offer distributions on z , both sides of (12) and (13) 
C. Three State Model -Continuous Time
To begin the continuous time model we will return to our stationary assumption: W and N are random variables which don't change over time and don't depend on any other variables. Time is continuous, and wage offers can arrive at any time. The offers themselves are discrete and arrive at random times. We will assume that the offer arrival times are Poisson distributed, so that the time until a next arrival does not depend on the wait since last arrival.
One major change from the discrete time model (although this could have been incorporated in the discrete time model) is that wage offers will be allowed to arrive in all states. In other words an individual in the job state will receive offers without having to quit. What will distinguish the job, OLF, and search states is the rate of arrival of offers. The search state will presumably have the highest rate of arrival of new job offers, with job and OLF lower. The arrival rate for non-wage offers we will denote by µ , and for wage offers in the employment, out of the labor force, and search states by λ 1 , λ 2 , and λ 3 .
To derive the functional equation for the value, we will first derive functional equations for each of the states separately. The values for job, OLF, and search we will denote by V 1 (w) , V 2 (w) , and V 3 . To calculate the value, we need to know two things. First, when does a new offer arrive, and second, what kind of offer is it. For the job state, two kinds of offers, non-wage and wage, arrive. The non-wage offers arrive at rate µ , the wage offers are rate λ 1 . The time of arrival of some offer is the minimum of the time of arrival of either non-wage or wage offers, and so arrives at rate µ+λ 1 . In other words, since the density of arrival times for non-wage offers is µe -µt and for wage offers is
the density of some arrival is (µ+λ 1 )e -(µ+λ1)t .
We also know the density of non-wage offers conditional on the non-wage offering first. 
The conditional density is
Similarly, the density for t , conditional that the wage offer arrives first, is In the job state, an individual continues in the state until a new offer arrives. At that time he can choose to switch to the OLF state (if a non-wage offer arrives) or switch to a better job (if a wage offer arrives). We implicitly assume that workers are not allowed to switch to a better state except at arrivals of new offers. For example, a worker who happens to be at a low paying job might desire to switch to search, but we will not allow him to do so except when new offers arrive. This will not affect the value of the job state when the job state is optimal, and that is all we are interested in. One minor problem arises when comparing the job and OLF states at zero wage and non-wage levels. It is possible, for certain sets of parameters, for a zero-wage job to be of higher value than a zero, or even slightly positive, non-wage offer. We will allow individuals to switch into the zero-wage job, although we will generally pick parameters so the situation doesn't arise ( λ 1 ≤λ 2 ). a) Being paid wage w until time τ , then receiving a new wage offer. The worker can either continue at w , take the new W (if it is higher) or switch to search. This is all conditional on the wage offer arriving first. 
For the OLF state, the choices facing an individual are a) Receiving non-wage benefits n until τ , then receiving a new non-wage offer, N . The individual can then choose between search, V 3 , and continuing in the OLF state, V 2 (N) . This is conditional on the non-wage offer arriving first. 
For the search state, the choices facing an individual are a) Paying the cost c per unit time until τ , then receiving a new non-wage offer, N . The individual can then choose between search, V 3 , and switching to OLF, V 2 (N) . This is conditional on the non-wage offer arriving first.
[ 
Putting all three values together, we can say that the value to the individual of this search problem is 
Note, however, that when the job is optimal, (20)
Similarly, when OLF is optimal,
[ ]
and when search is optimal
Thus V(w,n) can be expressed as 
Performing similar algebra on (21) and (22) Equation (24) can be derived in one step by an alternative method. In the job state, the following four events, with their associated rate of arrivals, could occur: a) A new non-job (OLF) offer, N , arrives, with rate µ . b) A new job offer, W , arrives, with rate λ 1 . c) A new job offer for the OLF state arrives, with rate λ 2 . Since we are in the state;
i.e., the same wage w . d) A new job offer for the search state arrives, with rate λ 3 . Since we are in the job state, this is no change in the state; i.e., the same wage w .
Calling the time of first arrival τ , the conditional densities for the events a), b), c), d) to occur first are (see equation (14)) (We are implicitly assuming that once a worker takes a job he cannot go back to the OLF state. This won't matter if the job is the optimal state since a worker would not go to OLF, and if the job is not optimal we don't really care what the value of the job state is.) Using the conditional densities above to take the expectation over τ , we get for the job state
Similarly for the OLF and search states we get 
The existence and uniqueness of V(w,n) is established in the appendix, as is the increasingness in (w,n) . It should be clear that the model summarized by equation (24) has a reservation wage for given n , and a reservation non-wage offer for given w .
We can introduce non-voluntary lay-offs in the job state by introducing layoffs that occur at random, Poisson distributed times. Following an argument analogous to that above, we get the expected value of the three states as:
2) OLF:
and the value function as the maximum of the three. Note that because of the layoffs, where a worker is required to fall back on the non-wage offer, n enters into the job state in a non-trivial way. This also means that there might be no unique reservation non-wage offer. For a given n , however, there will still be a unique reservation wage offer.
Just as the discrete time model can be extended by adding correlated wage offers and a state of the economy variable, the continuous time model can be extended. It is largely, however, a matter of notation, since we just make W and N random functions which depend on the current w and n . Formally, let a probability space (Ω,ℑ,P) be given and
We will assume that W(⋅) , N(⋅) , Z(⋅) are all increasing in w , n , z for each ω∈Ω . New wage and non-wage offers arrivals are Poisson as before (wage offers with means λ 1 , λ 2 , λ 3 in the employment, OLF, and search state, non-wage offers with mean µ ). New states of the economy arrive at rate ν . The functional fixed point equation is 
APPENDIX A
We prove assertions in this appendix to keep the text uncluttered and to allow more rigorous proofs. In some cases we have repeated proofs from the text for completeness. The methods used here are simple and well known to mathematicians, but because they have not been widely used in the search literature we have laid out some of the proofs in more detail than is absolutely necessary. The concept we use, fixed point functional equations, is not too complex and the mechanics of proving existence, uniqueness, and other properties is simple.
II. A. Three State Stationary Model Preliminaries
The basic equation for this model is (1), reproduced here as equation (A.1).
is the basic equation of our model. The problem is to prove that there is actually function V(w,n) for which (A.1) holds; so far we have only assumed such a function exists. To tackle this problem we will look at (A.1) in a slightly different light. For any continuous, bounded function v(⋅,⋅) ; define the operation T by
First, we show that for any v 0 (⋅,⋅) , (Tv)(⋅,⋅) is a new function, v 1 (⋅,⋅) , which is also continuous and bounded, given that the range of W , N are bounded, i.e., that we don't allow infinite wage and non-wage offers. This leads to Assumption 1 -The values of W , N , the random wage and non-wage draws, are bounded between zero and M<∞ . I.e. 0≤W≤M , 0≤N≤M , M<∞ .
T is an operator from the space of continuous functions back to the same space. Thus equation (A.1) can also be written as a fixed point functional equation
In essence this is no more complicated than an implicit function (say x = e x + 1 ), which may have zero, one, or many solutions. The real difference, and this turns out to be relatively unimportant, is that e x + 1 takes real numbers, x , and maps them back into real numbers, while the operator T takes functions and maps them back into functions. By defining the appropriate measure of distance between the two functions v 0 (.,.) and v 1 (.,.) , we can forget that v 0 and v 1 are functions and treat them almost as if they were points in space. , e.g., Wouk (1979) .)
The method just outlined has a very simple intuitive and economic interpretation. We can use the operator T defined in (A. To allow for greater generality later, we will allow more general random variables than just W , N . In other words, we will prove the existence and uniqueness of a function which satisfies Another possibility might be
with X 1 and X 3 remaining the same. This would correspond to receiving wage offers in the OLF state, but only with a probability p .
To use Blackwell's conditions, we just have to show a) and b) above. Monotonicity is simple, since v 0 (w,n) ≤ v 1 (w,n) implies Showing T(v+k)(w,n) = (Tv)(w,n) + βk , k constant, is simple, since 
We have found a trick that, while not very elegant, seems to work. Instead of treating the value function as a function of (w,n) and the random variables (W,N) (with distributions F(x) , G(y) ), treat it as a function of an underlying probability space. Use the space (Ω,ℑ,P) = ((0,1), Borel sets of (0,1), Lebesgue measure). Make W,N random variables of ω∈Ω . Since any distribution F(x) on ℜ 1 can be represented by a random variable on (Ω,ℑ,P) , we can represent any random variable W with distribution F(x) by a random function W(ω) . Thus we can think of w(⋅) and n(⋅) as functions of t 1 and t 2 , w(t 1 ) , n(t 1 ) . We now rewrite (A.1) as
is integrable, and (Tv 1 )(t 1 ,t 2 )<∞ ∀(t 1 ,t 2 ) such that w(t 1 )<∞ , n(t 2 )<∞ .
Proof: Given the condition (A.4), òv 0 (t 1 ,ω 2 )dω 2 <∞ ∀t 1 s.t. w(t 1 )<∞ òv 0 (ω 1 ,ω 2 )dω 1 dω 2 <∞ . So when w(t 1 )<∞ , n(t 1 )<∞ , (Tv 0 )(t 1 ,t 2 )<∞ . In addition ( ) We want to find if the functional fixed point equation, (A.16) v(w,n,z) = (Tv) (w,n,z) where T is the operation on the right hand side of (A.15), has a unique fixed point, v * (w,n,z) . Our claim is that We could have introduced more complex wage offer structures and the proofs of existence and uniqueness of (1) would still have stood. The proof of existence and uniqueness of (1) For the non-stationary continuous-time model the proof follows the same strategy as for the discrete time model. We show that, for every z * ( ) ( )
